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Two experiments were designed to test the hypothesis that affective information looms
relatively larger than cognitive information when individuals are distracted for a period of
time compared to when they engage in deliberative thinking. In two studies, participants
were presentedwith information about 4 decision alternatives: An affective alternative that
scored high on affective attributes but low on cognitive attributes, a cognitive alternative
with the opposite trade-off, and two fillers. They were then asked to indicate their attitudes
toward each of four decision alternatives either immediately, after a period of deliberation,
or after a period of distraction. The results of both experiments demonstrated that
participants significantly preferred the affective alternative to the cognitive alternative after
distraction, but not after deliberation. The implications for understanding when and how
unconscious thought may lead to better decisions are being discussed.
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Introduction
When people make a choice, they often need to make tradeoffs between affective (hedonic) and
cognitive (utilitarian) attributes. As an example, one may need to make a choice between a glass
of soy or chocolate milk. Soy milk is healthy (a positive cognitive feature) but not all that tasty
(a neutral or even negative affective feature), whereas chocolate milk is very tasty (a positive
affective feature) but not very healthy (a negative cognitive feature). A substantial amount of
research has established that the influence of these two types of features or attributes on preference
or choice depends on the context (Wilson and Schooler, 1991; Wilson et al., 1993; Dhar and
Wertenbroch, 2000; Dubé and Cantin, 2000). For instance, it was demonstrated that “food liking”
is more influenced by the affective attribute (e.g., refreshing, tasteful) of a product, whereas “food
consumption” is more influenced by the cognitive attribute (e.g., healthy, full of vitamins) (Dubé
and Cantin, 2000), and that the relative salience of affective attributes is greater in forfeiture choices
than in acquisition choices (Dhar and Wertenbroch, 2000).
Given that deliberatively thinking or distracting oneself (or being distracted) for some time are
two usual ways for people to make a difficult choice, the central question we ask here is whether the
influence of affective and cognitive attributes on preference depends on the two ways of making a
choice. The answer to this question would shed some light on the underlying process of the effects
that deliberation deteriorates (e.g.,Wilson and Schooler, 1991;Wilson et al., 1993), while distraction
improves decision quality or satisfaction (e.g., Dijksterhuis and Nordgren, 2006; Lerouge, 2009;
Ham and van den Bos, 2010; Messner and Wänke, 2011; Strick et al., 2011; Abadie et al., 2013;
Creswell et al., 2013). From a practical view, a better understanding of what information can largely
Wang et al. Differential impact of affective and cognitive attributes
influence and predict people’s choice under deliberation and
distraction has implications for everyday decision making, as
well as for marketing and persuasive communication.We assume
that affective attributes loom relatively larger after a period of
distraction whereas cognitive attributes have more impact on
preference after a period of deliberation. This assumption is
derived from the following two lines of research.
One line of research demonstrates that deliberately thinking
reduces quality or satisfaction of decisions (Wilson and Schooler,
1991; Wilson et al., 1993). In one of the studies, participants
were asked to choose between art posters under a deliberation
condition where they were asked to list their reasons for liking
or disliking each poster, and a control condition where they
were not given such an opportunity. All participants were given
their selected art poster to take home and were phoned a few
weeks later. Participants in the deliberation condition were less
satisfied with their posters than control participants. The authors
proposed that participants in the deliberation condition may put
too much weight on attributes that are easy to verbalize and seem
like plausible reasons but put less weight to feelings which are
often difficult to be verbalized exactly. Over time, however, when
their true attitudes return, they come to feel less satisfied (Wilson
et al., 1993). In line with this view, Bohm and Pfister (1996) asked
participants to indicate their preference for a set of options (i.e.,
eight prizes they had won and could choose from), as well as rate
utilitarian and affective associations of these options, either in a
private choice context (i.e., in a mail lottery) or in a public choice
context (i.e., in a TV show). The authors show that in the private
choice context, participants’ preferences were more influenced
by affective associations, whereas in a public choice context, due
to justification demands, preferences were more influenced by
utilitarian considerations.
Another line of research suggests that distraction period
elicits unconscious thought, which leads to better complex
decision quality (Lerouge, 2009; Ham and van den Bos, 2010;
Strick et al., 2011), higher choice satisfaction (Dijksterhuis
and van Olden, 2006; Messner and Wänke, 2011), as well
as better lie detection (Reinhard et al., 2013). Unconscious
thought refers to “object-relevant or task-relevant cognitive or
affective thought processes that occur while conscious attention
is directed elsewhere” (Dijksterhuis and Nordgren, 2006, p. 96).
Regarding to the underlying processes of unconscious thought
effect, Dijksterhuis and Nordgren (2006, p. 107) contended
that the superior decision performance of unconscious thought
might be because it “somehow uses the affective tone of the
information better than conscious thought does.” Messner and
Wänke (2011) found that participants are more satisfied with a
praline chosen from a large assortment when they were distracted
before choosing than when they either deliberated intensively
or chose immediately. With regard to the possible explanation
for this effect, in addition to the larger capacity of unconscious
thought compared to conscious thought, the authors proposed
that the higher choice satisfaction of unconscious thinkers might
be caused by a greater reliance on the affective cues of a product
(i.e., imaging the taste of a praline) whereas conscious thinkers
may have relied too much on the individual components and
neglected to imagine how these components would taste in
combination. According to these propositions, it seems that
affective attributes that activate more feelings and affective
considerations will loom relatively larger when people engage
in unconscious thought than when they engage in deliberately
thinking.
Based on the above analysis, the present research tested
the hypothesis that affective attributes loom relatively larger
under a period distraction whereas cognitive attributes will have
more impact after a period deliberation. In two experiments,
participants were presented with information about four
hypothetical alternatives (i.e., apartments). One alternative was
designed as the affective alternative that is superior on affective
attributes relative to cognitive attributes. Another apartment
was designed as the cognitive alternative that is superior on
cognitive attributes relative to affective attributes. The remaining
two alternatives were set as fillers. We predict that participants
who were distracted for a period of time will show a relatively
stronger preference for the affective alternative than those who
engaged in deliberatively thinking.
It should be noted in advance that we do not aim to show
that one mode of thought leads to better results than the other
mode of thought. We focus on affective vs. cognitive attributes,
and whether affective or cognitive attributes make one alternative
better than another alternative depends entirely on the decision
domain and on the specific attribute in question, a point which
we return to in the Discussion.
Experiment 1
Methods
Participants and Design
One hundred and eighty students recruited on the campus (150
female, 30 male, mean age = 21.20 years) were randomly assigned
to a distraction, a deliberation, and an immediate condition (60
participants per condition). Participants were paid a small fee for
their participation1.
Materials
In the study, we described the four apartments (Apartments
A–D) in terms of two affective attributes and two cognitive
attributes2. Alternatives differed in the valence of these two
types of attributes. Apartment A and C were filler alternatives.
Apartment B had high values on the affective attributes (e.g.,
view of the apartment is a park) but low values on the cognitive
attributes (e.g., 20min away from the work or study place) was
designed and was termed the affective alternative. Apartment D
offered the opposite trade-off, namely, with low values on the
affective attributes (e.g., view of the apartment is a parking lot)
but high values on the cognitive (e.g., 10min away from the
1This research was conducted in accordance with the ethical guidelines of the
American Psychological Association and approved by the academic and ethics
committee of Department of psychology, Ningbo University. We determined our
sample size by basing it on the central limit theorem. We sampled until we had 60
per condition (our stopping rule).
2In the Online Supplementary Information, we describe how these attributes were
chosen. From the chosen attributes, we then validated the distinctiveness of the
affective attributes from the cognitive attributes.
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work or study place) was termed the cognitive alternative. Table 1
shows complete description of the alternatives.
Procedure
The experiment was described as an experiment on decision-
making. Participants were presented with information about four
hypothetical apartments, labeled A, B, C, and D, respectively.
They were asked to form an impression of the four apartments.
The attributes of each apartment were presented, one by one in
random order (4 s per attribute). The order of presentation of
information about the four apartments was randomized.
Thereafter, participants were randomly assigned to one
of three conditions. In the immediate condition, they were
immediately asked to give their attitude toward each of the
four apartments (in the order from Apartments A to D) on 11-
point scales ranging from 0 (extremely negative) to 10 (extremely
positive). Participants in the deliberation condition were asked to
“think very carefully about what you think of each of the four
apartments and write down the advantages and disadvantages
of the apartments.” In the distraction condition, after the
presentation of the four apartments, participants were presented
with a series of digital numbers (ranging from 1 to 99) and
for each number they were asked to decide whether it is a
multiple of 3 or not as quickly as possible by pressing a key.
Three minutes later, participants in both the deliberation and
distraction conditions were asked to respond to the same attitude
measure, as participants in the immediate condition.
Results
A 2 (type of alternative: affective alternative/cognitive
alternative)3 × 3 (decision condition: distraction/deliberation/
immediate condition) mixed ANOVA showed a significant main
effect of the type of alternative, F(1, 177) = 30.59, p < 0.01,
η
2
p = 0.147, nomain effect of decision condition, F(2, 177) = 1.04,
p = 0.62, η2p = 0.005, and a significant interaction between the
type of alternative and the decision condition, F(2, 177) = 3.15,
p < 0.05, η2p = 0.034.
Further analysis revealed a significant difference between the
preference score for the affective alternative (M = 6.88, SD =
1.91) and the cognitive alternative (M = 5.12, SD = 1.75) in
the distraction condition, t(59) = 5.14, p < 0.001, d = 0.96.
The difference between the preference score for the affective
alternative (M = 6.55, SD = 2.00) and the cognitive alternative
3For each of the three conditions, the preference scores for the two fillers fell
somewhere in between the two experimental alternatives (Apartments B and D)
in both Experiments 1 and 2.
(M = 5.70, SD = 1.86) was also significant in the immediate
condition, t(59) = 2.48, p < 0.05, d = 0.44. However, no
significant difference was found between the preference score for
the affective alternative (M = 6.55, SD= 1.65) and the preference
score for the cognitive alternative (M = 5.92, SD = 1.92) in
the deliberation condition, t(59) = 1.92, p > 0.05, d = 0.35.
Participants’ mean preference score for the alternatives is graphed
as a function of decision condition in Figure 1.
The immediate condition was designed as a baseline to further
determine whether it is deliberation or thought process that
occurs during distraction, or both, that influenced the preference.
Of particular interest is whether distraction leads to preference
change compared to immediate condition. If this is true, it might
indicate that distraction elicits some special thought process
(i.e., unconscious thought) as suggested by Dijksterhuis (2004),
Dijksterhuis and Nordgren (2006).
We therefore firstly compared the preference pattern
between the immediate and distraction conditions. A 2 (type
of alternative: cognitive/affective) × 2 (decision condition:
distraction/immediate) mixed ANOVA revealed a marginally
significant interaction [F(1, 118) = 3.56, p = 0.06, η
2
p = 0.03]. A
Bayesian approach (Dienes, 2008, 2014) was taken to interpret
this finding. The raw interaction effect between these two
conditions is: (preference for affective alternative - preference for
cognitive alternative) in the distraction condition - (preference
for affective alternative - preference for cognitive alternative) in
the immediate condition= (6.88− 5.12)− (6.55− 5.70) = 0.91.
To calculate Bayes factor, the predicted size of the interaction
needs to be specified, based on a specific theoretical framework.
If distraction leads to more weight to affective attributes than
cognitive attributes, while deliberation works the opposite
way, with immediate condition falling in between, then the
maximum size of the interaction effect between the distraction
and immediate conditions would be the interaction effect
between the distraction and deliberation conditions. That is,
(preference for affective alternative - preference for cognitive
alternative) in the distraction condition - (preference for
affective alternative - preference for cognitive alternative) in the
deliberation condition = (6.88 − 5.12) − (6.55 − 5.92) = 1.13.
The interaction effect would not be smaller than 0.
Bayes factor (B) calculated using the online software described
in Dienes (2008), representing the predictions as uniform
distribution, is 4.16. Bs less than 1/3 indicate substantial support
for the null, Bs between 3 and 10 indicate substantial support
for the alternative (Bs above 10 indicate “strongly” support for
alternative), and Bs between 1/3 and 3 indicate data insensitive
TABLE 1 | Attributes of apartments in Experiment 1.
Affective attributes Cognitive attributes
View from the apartment Landlord Security level Distance to work or study
Apartment A (filler) Park Unkind Above average 20min
Apartment B (affective) Park Kind Average 20min
Apartment C (filler) Parking lot Kind Average 10min
Apartment D (cognitive) Parking lot Unkind Above average 10min
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FIGURE 1 | Average preference score for affective and cognitive alternatives as a function of decision condition. Error bars represent 1 SEM.
(Jeffreys, 1939/1961). Therefore, the results provided substantial
supporting evidence for the hypothesis that distraction leads to
more weight being given to the affective attributes than cognitive
attributes.
Second, to compare the preference pattern between the
immediate and deliberation conditions, the interaction
between these two conditions were analyzed using a 2 (type
of alternative: cognitive/affective) × 2 (decision condition:
immediate/deliberation) mixed ANOVA. Non-significant
difference was obtained [F(1, 118) = 0.21, p = 0.65, η
2
p = 0.00].
Bayes analysis was performed based on the similar rationale as
above. Bayes factor (B = 0.74) indicate data insensitivity.
Discussion
These findings support the hypothesis that affective attributes
weigh more strongly than cognitive attributes under distraction
than deliberation. Bayesian analysis indicates that distraction
may elicit unconscious thought, which leads to different
preference pattern between the distraction condition and
immediate condition.
One may note that in all conditions, the affective alternative
was more positive relative to the cognitive alternative (though
not significantly so in the deliberation condition). In principle,
it should be possible to find a preference reversal in that
participants who were in the distraction condition preferred the
affective alternative over the cognitive alternative (as found in
Experiment 1) and that participants who engaged in deliberation
preferred the cognitive alternative over the affective alternative.
In order to increase the possibility of finding this reversal, we
changed our stimulus materials in Experiment 2.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 aimed at extending the results of Experiment 1
with the following three aspects changed. First, the number of
attributes of each alternative was increased from 4 to 6 such
that the decision task was relatively more complex, and we
added an important cognitive aspect (i.e., cost) to make the
cognitive alternative more attractive. Second, we presented the
attributes of each apartment as a list and made them appear
all at once rather than one by one in random order. Third, a
thought process check was employed to confirm the effectiveness
of the manipulation of the deliberation and distraction
conditions.
Methods
Participants and Design
One hundred and eighty students recruited on campus (128
female, 52male, mean age= 20.82 years) were randomly assigned
to one of three conditions: a distraction, a deliberation, and an
immediate condition (60 participants per condition). They were
paid a small fee for their participation.
Materials
As in Experiment 1, Apartment B was designed as the affective
alternative which had high values on the affective attributes but
low values on the cognitive attributes and Apartment D was
designed as the cognitive alternative which had low values on
the affective attributes but high values on the cognitive attributes.
Apartments A and C were fillers. Table 2 shows the complete
description of the alternatives.
Procedure
The attributes of each apartment were presented as a list and
appeared all at once for 15 s. Furthermore, a manipulation check
of the thought process was included in the deliberation and
distraction conditions. Participants were asked to respond to an
item “Have you engaged in deliberation about the information
about the apartments?” (0= “not at all”; 10= “very often”).
Results
Manipulation Check
The score in the deliberation condition (M = 7.32, SD = 1.88)
was significantly higher than that in the distraction condition
(M = 4.20, SD= 3.12) on thought process check (t = −6.63, p <
0.001), which confirmed the effectiveness of the manipulation.
Preference
A 2 (type of alternative: affective alternative/cognitive
alternative) × 3 (decision condition: distraction/
deliberation/immediate condition) mixed repeated ANOVA
showed no significant main effects of type of alternative,
F(1, 177) = 1.09, p = 0.30, η
2
p = 0.01, and decision condition,
F(2, 177) = 0.57, p = 0.57, η
2
p = 0.01, but a significant
interaction, F(2, 177) = 7.68, p < 0.01, η
2
p = 0.08.
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TABLE 2 | Attributes of apartments in Experiment 2.
Affective attributes Cognitive attributes
View from the Residential Landlord Rent for the Distance to work Network
apartment landscaping apartment or study signal
Apartment A (filler) Park Pleasant Unkind Relatively expensive Relatively close Poor
Apartment B (affective) Park Pleasant Kind Relatively expensive Relatively far Poor
Apartment C (filler) Parking lot Unpleasant Kind Relatively cheap Relatively far Strong
Apartment D (cognitive) Parking lot Unpleasant Unkind Relatively cheap Relatively close Strong
Further analysis revealed that the preference score for the
affective alternative (M = 6.30, SD = 2.04) was significantly
higher than that for the cognitive alternative (M = 5.43, SD =
1.98) in the distraction condition, t(59) = 2.36, p < 0.05, d =
0.43. The difference between the preference score for the affective
alternative (M = 6.12, SD = 2.00) and the cognitive alternative
(M = 5.32, SD = 1.97) was also significant in the immediate
condition, t(59) = 2.12, p < 0.05, d = 0.39. However, a clearly
reversed pattern was observed in the deliberation condition, that
is, the preference score for the cognitive alternative (M = 6.08,
SD = 2.33) was significantly higher than that for the affective
alternative (M = 5.10, SD = 1.90), t(59) = −2.52, p < 0.05,
d = 0.46. Participants’ mean preference score for the alternatives
is graphed as a function of decision condition in Figure 2.
As in Experiment 1, preference pattern for the affective
and cognitive alternatives in the distraction and deliberation
conditions was compared to that in the immediate condition
respectively. A 2 (type of alternative: cognitive/affective) ×
2 (decision condition: distraction/immediate) mixed ANOVA
revealed a non-significant interaction between the distraction
condition and immediate condition, F(1, 118) = 0.02, p =
0.90, η2p = 0.00. The raw interaction effect between these
two conditions is 0.07. The predicted size of interaction effect
ranges from 0 to 1.85. Bayes factor (B = 0.37) indicates
data insensitivity. A 2 (type of alternative: cognitive/affective) ×
2 (decision condition: immediate/deliberation) mixed ANOVA
revealed a significant interaction between the immediate and
deliberation conditions, F(1, 118) = 10.78, p = 0.001, η
2
p =
0.08. Bayes factor (B = 80.78) provides strong evidence for the
hypothesis that a period of deliberation attached more weight to
cognitive attributes than affective attributes.
Discussion
These findings strongly supported the hypothesis that affective
attributes weigh stronger than cognitive attributes under the
distraction condition compared to the deliberation condition,
which led to the preference for the affective alternative in the
distraction condition but preference for the cognitive alternative
in the deliberation condition.
General Discussion
The present study examined whether affective and cognitive
attributes would disproportionately influence preferences under
deliberation and distraction. Indeed, we found that distraction,
compared to deliberation, led people to put more weight
on affective rather than cognitive attributes. Comparing the
deliberation, as well as the distraction condition, to the
immediate condition provides a chance to further determine
whether it is distraction or deliberation that influenced the
salience of the affective and cognitive attributes. The findings
in Experiment 1, based on Bayes analysis, provide substantial
evidence for the hypothesis that distraction influenced the
relative salience of the affective and cognitive attributes,
although it was not confirmed in Experiment 2 because of
data insensitivity. The findings in Experiment 2 provide strong
evidence for the hypothesis that cognitive attributes have more
impact on preference after a period of deliberation. Taken
together, these findings indicate that both distraction and
deliberation influence the salience of the affective and cognitive
attributes.
Different preference pattern between the distraction condition
and immediate condition seems indicate that some special
thought process—perhaps unconscious thought as defined
by Dijksterhuis (2004), Dijksterhuis and Nordgren (2006)—
occurred during the distraction period. If not, no difference
would have been observed between these two conditions. Then,
why are affective alternatives preferred by unconscious thought?
Unconscious thought is described as a holistic process that gives
rough estimates (Dijksterhuis and Nordgren, 2006). Recently,
Abadie et al. (2013) suggest that unconscious thought is more
likely to be based on gist representations rather than verbatim
representations. An effective response to an alternative formed
mainly by affective attributes, such as kind vs. unkind landlord, is
a holistic, qualitative or vague representation of the alternative.
Alternatively, a cognitive response, which mainly formed by
cognitive attributes such as the distance to work is 10 vs.
20min, is relatively more precise and quantitative. That may
be why the influence of affective attributes on preference
was relatively unaffected during distraction or unconscious
thought. Creswell et al. (2013) provided the first neural evidence
for the unconscious thought process. They found that the
same brain regions (the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
and left intermediate visual cortex) that were responsible for
information encoding continue to be active during distraction
(i.e., unconscious thought), and the strength of these activations
predicted the ability to discriminate between best and worst items
in the decision tasks that the participant undertook. Visual cortex
activation is associated with vividness of perception or memories.
The vividness of information is to some extent depending on
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FIGURE 2 | Average preference score for affective and cognitive alternatives as a function of decision condition. Error bars represent 1 SEM.
its affective property (McGill and Anand, 1989; Bywaters et al.,
2004; Todd et al., 2012). Affective attributes, therefore, maintain
its salience during unconscious thought processes.
It should be noted, however, that, as we briefly hinted at
in the Introduction, our studies were not aimed at showing
that one of the modes of thought (conscious vs. unconscious
thought) leads to better decisions than the other. Actually, much
doubt has been cast in recent years on the unconscious thought
advantage (see Acker, 2008; Nieuwenstein and Van Rijn, 2012;
Nieuwenstein et al., 2015). We focused on whether affective
or cognitive attributes have different influence on preference
under distraction and deliberation. Another point that need to
be noted is that merely stating a preference without having to
experience the consequences of that choice feels quite different
compared to deciding for something and then having to live
with the potential consequences of the decision. It would be
interesting in future research to investigate choice tasks with real
consequences.
Although our studies did not focus on decision quality or
satisfaction, it may still have implications for making a better
choice. Previous research on attitude-behavior relation suggests
that behaviors may either be cognitively or affectively driven by
attitudes, and thought processes may make either the affective or
cognitive components of the attitude more salient and thus more
important when making choices. A match between the attitude
components that drive behavior and the attitude components
emphasized by thought processes would increase the attitude-
behavior relation, whereas a mismatch would decrease the
relation (Millar and Tesser, 1986; Wilson and Dunn, 1986).
If choices are affectively driven—one can think of (romantic)
relationships, or art, in this respect—let affective attributes play
a larger role than cognitive attributes would improve decision
satisfaction (i.e., attitude-behavior relation). On other occasions,
such as when buying a new washing machine, it seems reasonable
to let the cognitive attributes trump the affective ones. And with
yet other decisions—such as when buying a house—both should
ideally be taken into account. If our conclusions are confirmed in
independent replications, the current analysis may lead to a very
practical moderator: When a decision is largely affective, make
it after a period of distraction, if it is very cognitive, engage in
deliberation first.
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